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SUMMARY
Underreporting of hepatitis A infection in England may be high and a number of outbreaks
have occurred undetected by routine surveillance. We evaluated surveillance of hepatitis A cases
by employing capture–recapture analysis on data from two distinct outbreaks of hepatitis A.
The overall reporting of cases of hepatitis A was 81.7% (95% CI 55.3–95) in the ﬁrst outbreak
in North East England and reporting through Lab Base was 65.7% (95% CI 42.8–76.4). In the
second outbreak in the East Midlands the overall reporting of hepatitis A cases was 27.8%
(95% CI 19–38.7) and through Lab Base 16.6% (95% CI 11.4–23.1). Underreporting of
hepatitis A cases is high. Public health interventions exist to prevent and control outbreaks of
hepatitis A. The lack of reliable data on incidence and prevalence hampers eﬀective public health
management of this disease.
INTRODUCTION
Hepatitis A is a viral infection that can be transmitted
faeco-orally amongst vulnerable populations. An
eﬀective vaccine is available but it is not part of the
routine immunization schedule in the United King-
dom. A large proportion of the UK population is
susceptible to hepatitis A infection. A large national
epidemic of hepatitis A peaked in 2002. The peak
consisted of a series of outbreaks across the United
Kingdom [1, 2]. Most of these outbreaks were not
detected through the routine surveillance systems in
place, raising concerns about data quality and the ef-
fectiveness of public health surveillance [3]. We aimed
to quantify the degree of underreporting of cases of
hepatitis A by the national laboratory reporting
system (Lab Base) by applying capture–recapture
techniques to data from two diﬀerent outbreaks of
this infection in England.
METHODS
The ﬁrst outbreak occurred in the North East of
England in 2002. Three data sources were available
here. The local Health Protection Unit (HPU) sup-
plied us with a list of cases. A pilot project carried
out by the then PHLS (Public Health Laboratory
Service) investigating genotyping of hepatitis A cases
[4] provided us with another dataset. These two were
compared to the Lab Base dataset. Comparison of
cases was carried out using an Access database.
The second outbreak we considered occurred in the
East Midlands in 2003. The local HPU supplied us
with a dataset and this was compared with the Lab
Base dataset. No other dataset was available for this
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outbreak. Comparison of cases was carried out using
an Access database.
Capture–recapture analyses for both outbreaks
used STATA version 8.2 (Stata Corp., College Station,
TX, USA). Capture–recapture techniques were
applied to these data sources to allow for under-
reporting in the diﬀerent data sources for the two
distinct outbreaks [5].
Log-linear modelling was used to estimate the
number of cases in each area. A saturated model was
used for each dataset. For three data sources, the
saturated model included two-way interactions, all
of which we believed to be meaningful. The Akaike
Information Criteria (AIC) was used to check that
the interactions were reﬂected in the data. Proﬁle
Poisson likelihood intervals were used to calculate
95% conﬁdence intervals (CI).
RESULTS
In the ﬁrst outbreak Lab Base recorded 155 cases. The
data source from the local HPU recorded 101 cases.
The dataset derived from the genotyping project
recorded 94 cases. In total 350 cases were detected.
Cases were matched between all three sources using
surnames, date of birth and sample date variables.
After matching we concluded that the 350 entries
represented 193 diﬀerent cases (Fig. 1). The number
of additional cases was estimated to be 43 (95% CI
10–169) based on the three-way interaction being
zero. Knowing something of the administrative
procedures which gave rise to the lists, we expected
statistical dependency between pairs of lists, especially
between the Lab Base data and the genotyping data,
and an additional but smaller degree of dependency
between all three lists.
A saturated model (three main eﬀects and three
two-way interactions) was chosen to account for
possible dependency between sources. Our estimate
of 43 unlisted cases can be realistically increased to
300 or more by estimating the impact of varying visi-
bility on the size of the three-way interaction. If we
assume that each case has a visibility on the scale 0–1,
maximal visibility where v=1 is associated with a zero
three-way interaction. If the average visibility in the
population is 0.8, 0.5 or 0.2 the three-way interaction
is greater than 0 and increases the estimated number
of missing cases to 103, 279 or 937 respectively. We
assessed how sensitive the prediction is to matching
errors. The data were adjusted in six diﬀerent ways
to represent the eﬀect of a single erroneous match,
and the model was reﬁtted each time. The estimate
of 43 increased by x4, 0, 5, 5, 12 and 18 in the six
cases, and it can be assumed that roughly opposite
eﬀects would be produced by the converse errors.
For the second outbreak, we only had two lists.
The ﬁrst was derived from Lab Base (184 cases) and
the second a database from the HPU that had been
enhanced through active case ﬁnding by one member
of staﬀ (124 cases). Matching was carried out using
date of birth and sample dates. In total 308 cases
were detected. After matching we concluded that the
308 entries represented 287 diﬀerent cases (Fig. 2).
Using a saturated model the number of additional
cases was estimated to be 799 (95% CI 488–1310).
As there were only two lists this is an independence
model. The conﬁdence interval was calculated from
a standard error on the log scale. We adjusted the
data to represent the eﬀect of a single matching error
in either direction. The point estimate of the number
of missed cases became 751 or 853 instead of 799.
The Table summarizes the estimates of potential
underreporting derived from the capture–recapture
analysis.
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Fig. 1. Diagram of the North East England outbreak,
2002 showing the three data sources used in the analysis
and the number of cases in each list and how many were
common between all the lists. a Data from the national
laboratory reporting system; b data derived from a project
carried out by the national Public Health Laboratory
on hepatitis A genotyping; c data from the local Health
Protection Unit.
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Fig. 2. Diagram of the East Midlands outbreak, 2003
showing the two data sources used in the analysis and the
number of cases in each list and how many were common to
both lists. a Data from the local Health Protection Unit ;
b data from the national laboratory reporting system.
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Varying catchability of cases can be allowed for
by stratifying the analysis by variables thought to be
related to capture (e.g. risk factor information,
ethnicity, post code, etc.), and then performing sep-
arate capture–recapture analyses for each stratum.
Unfortunately our data did not contain enough
additional information to allow further stratiﬁcation
analysis to allow for varying catchability.
DISCUSSION
Capture–recapture techniques have historically
been used to estimate the size of wildlife populations.
When applying this technique to human epidemiology
there are some limitations to consider. Capture in
one list is unlikely to be independent of capture
in another list. If a case appears on a HPU database,
that person has most probably sought medical advice
and been tested and so is more likely to appear on
a laboratory database. Moreover, the probability
of capture (catchability) is not necessarily hom-
ogeneous across all cases of hepatitis A. We con-
cluded that the total eﬀect of any errors we may have
made in matching was small compared with the un-
certainty represented by the conﬁdence limits. This
infection aﬀects marginalized groups in society in-
cluding injecting drug users (IDUs) who may be less
visible to health services than other vulnerable groups
such as returning travellers. The analysis of data from
the 2003 East Midlands outbreak showed lower levels
of reporting of cases within Lab Base than for the
2002 North East England outbreak. The active case
ﬁnding that was carried out by the HPU in the East
Midlands enhanced the HPU dataset identifying
additional cases that had not been notiﬁed to the
HPU. This enhanced dataset from the HPU may
have contributed to a much lower level of Lab Base
reporting being noted in the analysis. The apparent
better reporting of cases within Lab Base in the 2002
outbreak in the North East may have reﬂected better
reporting in that particular area or may be spurious.
Cases may have been missed from all three datasets
because they may not have been reported to the HPU
and the laboratory may have not reported this on
Lab Base.
Our analysis of two outbreaks taking place at
diﬀerent times and in diﬀerent regions shows that
levels of underreporting of hepatitis A cases in Lab
Base may be high. National surveillance relies on Lab
Base data. As eﬀective interventions to prevent
further spread of hepatitis A are available, under-
reporting matters because it prevents prompt and
eﬀective public health action to protect immediate
contacts of cases and their communities [6]. Most
of the UK population is susceptible to hepatitis A
[7], therefore cases and outbreaks that start in high-
risk groups may spread to the general population.
The regions with the highest rates of infection in
IDUs in recent years also have the highest rates of
infection in children [3] which may be due to spread
of the infection to the general population or to
Table. Reporting of cases of hepatitis A through the surveillance system
in two distinct outbreaks in England
NE England
2002 data
Comparing
3 datasets
East Midlands
2003 data
Comparing
2 datasets
Number of cases reported in all
the datasets
193 308
Number of cases common to all
the data sources
157 21
Number of additional cases
calculated by capture–recapture
analysis (95% CI)
43 (10–169) 799 (488–1310)
Overall reporting of cases
through the surveillance system
(95% CI)
81.7% (55.3–95) 27.8% (19–38.7)
Reporting of cases through Lab
Base (95% CI)
65.7% (42.8–76.4) 16.6% (11.4–23.1)
CI, Conﬁdence interval.
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socio-economic factors that increase the risk of
hepatitis A both in children and IDUs. Lack of de-
tailed risk factor information, ethnicity or postcode
information in Lab Base data hampered our ability to
carry out a stratiﬁed analysis. At a national level
geographical analysis of outbreaks has to be done
by laboratory rather than patient location. Some
patients may live a long way from the laboratory
where the blood test was processed. This hampers
accurate geographical analysis of outbreaks. With-
out detailed risk factor information it is diﬃcult to
address inequity of access to appropriate care and
control measures for vulnerable groups and diﬃcult
to develop and implement appropriate policy to
contain the spread of this infection. Local health
protection units may hold valuable information
about outbreaks of hepatitis A including additional
risk factor information and patient postcodes. Incor-
poration of this information with Lab Base data
needs to be improved in order to enhance national
surveillance of hepatitis A.
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